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In 1925, Yale professor George Counts
observed key problems in Philippine basic
education that, sadly, resonate with the
issues plaguing the Philippine education
system. Half of the school-aged children in
the 1920s were outside the reach of schools.
Pupil performance was generally low in
subjects that relied on English although
achievement in math and science was at par
with the average performance of American
school children. The functional literacy of
children in schools left much to be desired,
constraining learning in later grades.
More than 80 years after Counts published his
observations, basically the same issues
remain. Drop out rates, for instance, continue
to be high, threatening to leave many more
children out of school given the country’s
high population growth rate. Currently, about
28 to 34 percent of the population do not
reach or complete Grade 6. In the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM), the poorest region in terms of
human development, only 3 out of 10 children
who enter Grade 1 move on to Grade 6 while
only 1 out of the 10 will be able to reach
fourth year high school. Performance in
several subjects has also remained
pathetically low. Seen against the
achievement of Filipino pupils in science and
mathematics in the 1920s, pupil performance
in these subjects has deteriorated remarkably.
As to the language issue, it remains
unresolved in the minds of policymakers
despite numerous scientific studies supporting
the use of a child’s mother tongue in the first
few years of schooling and the Department of
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Education’s recent evidence-based policy that
support multilingual education.
This is not to say though that there have
been no attempts to improve Philippine
education. On the contrary, there have been
significant reform interventions at the level of
policy and programs since Counts joined the
Monroe Survey in the 1920s, many of them
progressive in their philosophy and
approaches. In the last 20 years alone,
several important broad frameworks for
education reform have been instituted—
Education for All: the Philippine Plan of
Action 1990–1999; the 1991 Congressional
Commission on Education (EDCOM); the 2000
Presidential Commission on Education Reform
(PCER); the 2000 Education for All (EFA)
Assessment; the ADB-WB initiated and funded
Philippine Education Sector Study (PESS); the
2006 National Action Plan for Education for
All 2015 (EFA 2015); and the 2006 Basic
Education Sector Reform Agenda (BESRA).
Why have these frameworks and the programs
they ushered not succeeded in transforming
the country’s education landscape? Why are
the analyses of the dismal state of Philippine
education tiresome in their repetition year
after year? What have constrained the
Department of Education (DepEd) from
translating the successful results of structural
reforms and programmatic changes into large-
scale, integrated, and sustained outcomes?
This Policy Note, which condenses the analysis
and recommendations in Chapter 2 of the
2008/2009 Philippine Human Development
Report (PHDR), provides insight into this
seeming paradox by focusing on one of the
reform measures discussed in the chapter—
the decentralization of basic education.
Decentralization through site
management: the SBM experience
in the Philippines
Decentralization through site management or
school-based management (SBM) is a major
global education reform thrust which started
in the 1980s. In the Philippines, the impetus
for its implementation in about 21 percent of
all school divisions in the country came with
the legislation of Republic Act (RA) 9155 or
the 2001 Governance of Basic Education Act,
a landmark law that transferred, at least in
theory, the governance of basic education to
schools. Within the law’s legal framework,
DepEd instituted SBM to make those closest
to the delivery of services more accountable
for the results of their operations. This was
DepEd’s response to the issue of excessive
centralization that the Monroe Survey noted
as early as the 1920s.
Decentralization through site management or school-
based management (SBM) is a major global education
reform thrust which started in the 1980s. In the
Philippines, the impetus for its implementation came
with the legislation of Republic Act (RA) 9155 or the
2001 Governance of Basic Education Act, a landmark
law that transferred, at least in theory, the governance
of basic education to schools. Within the law’s legal
framework, DepEd instituted SBM to make those
closest to the delivery of services more accountable for
the results of their operations.3
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As practiced in the Philippines, SBM is
more than a mechanism for decentralized
education governance. By giving schools
the autonomy to decide on administrative
and substantive matters, it has also
encouraged the exploration of various
strategies to improve learning. Moreover,
SBM has provided a framework for the
integrated management of diverse inputs
both for achieving equitable access to
quality education and instituting changes
in the approaches to learning and
pedagogy.
DepEd’s initial move toward decentralization
was through the implementation of externally
funded projects like the Basic Education
Assistance for Mindanao (BEAM), the Third
Elementary Education Project (TEEP), the
Secondary Education Development and
Improvement Project (SEDIP), and
Strengthening the Implementation of Basic
Education in Selected Regions in the Visayas
(STRIVE). Two of these successful projects are
described in Box 1.
While Project BEAM and TEEP differed in many
aspects such as their type and source of
funding; underlying philosophies of learning;
historical evolution and operationalization of
the SBM approach within each project; and
the politics of their SBM implementation, it
cannot be denied that both projects have
resulted in significant outcomes. In terms of
student achievement, for example, the
student assessment tests based on the basic
education curriculum competencies for BEAM
known as RAMSE or Regional Assessment in
Mathematics, Science, and English reveal that
the average scores of the learners increased
significantly from 2004 to 2006, particularly
for items reflecting higher-order thinking
skills. Similarly for TEEP, the universally
administered National Achievement Test (NAT)
results show that from SY 2002/2003 to SY
2006/2007, a higher proportion of TEEP-SBM
schools crossed the 75 percent NAT mean
percentage score, DepEd’s desired minimum
competency level, and the 60 percent “near
mastery” level compared to other clusters of
divisions that are as poor or less poor than
the TEEP divisions.
Beyond good student performance, both
Project BEAM and TEEP are replete with
stories disclosing their respective successes in
changing classroom and management
cultures. The 2008 BEAM Evaluation noted, for
instance, that the BEAM-trained teachers
tended to better understand “big ideas” and
appreciate that classrooms should be more
child-friendly, participative, and stimulating.
They also saw their role to be more of
encouraging creativity, inquisitiveness, and
group activities rather than of simply being
lecturers. TEEP contributions to the
As practiced in the Philippines, SBM is more than a
mechanism for decentralized education governance. By
giving schools the autonomy to decide on
administrative and substantive matters, it has also




Box 1. Project BEAM and TEEP
BEAM
The Basic Education Assistance for Mindanao (BEAM) project started in January 2002 and ended in November
2009. A US$25.66 million DepEd project funded by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid),
Project BEAM sought to improve the access to and quality of basic education in Southern and Central Mindanao,
specifically in Regions XI, XII, and ARMM in light of Mindanao’s broad-based poverty in education and peace and
order problem. Consisting of four components—human resource development; materials development; access; and
project management, monitoring and evaluation, Project BEAM built on the gains from earlier projects assisted by
the Australian government, specifically the Philippines-Australia Science and Mathematics Education Project
(PASMEP), which covered the whole Philippines but with primary focus on Regions II, VII, and X, and the Project on
Basic Education (PROBE), with a specific focus on Regions II, VII, IX, X, and XIII (Caraga).
Project BEAM’s underlying philosophy of learning asserts that higher-order thinking skills are likely to develop in
flexible and cooperative learning classroom environments rather than in environments characterized by a one-way
transmission of knowledge to passive learners. This is why BEAM invested substantially in capacity building at all
levels—teacher educators, teachers, school heads, division and regional personnel—toward learner-centered man-
agement and teaching.
Corollary to this, Project BEAM facilitated the formulation of School Improvement Plans (SIPs) that are oriented to
a student-centered, activity-based approach to teaching and learning in the divisions within its scope. The use of
these plans in school management constituted the operation of SBM in the BEAM project.
TEEP
The Third Elementary Education Project (TEEP), on the other hand, started in 1998, with financing from a govern-
ment loan agreement with the World Bank and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). It ended in
June 2006. Conceptualized in the context of the education crisis of 1990—e.g., lack of physical facilities and learning
materials, poor teacher quality, inequities of access, and inadequate financing, among others—the project consisted
of three major components: civil works, education and development, and financial administration.
TEEP did not begin with a well-articulated learning and training philosophy. Its conceptualization was enlightened
more by empirical research on the determinants of desirable student outcomes and the discursive thrust toward
decentralization worldwide than by a coherent philosophy of education. This is why TEEP allocated most of its
resources for the procurement of inputs such as classrooms and textbooks. The subsequent flow of resources to
education and training beginning in the early 2000s happened later in the project’s life, when SBM came to the
awareness of TEEP.
Given the late evolution of SBM and learning-oriented interventions in TEEP, its training was not as methodical
and systematic as that of Project BEAM. Unlike the latter’s reliance on a constructivist learning philosophy, TEEP
training was more pragmatist in its orientation. It developed from concrete demands that ranged from the need to
supervise classroom construction and procure goods to the more substantive improvement of learning outcomes.
Because TEEP proceeded without a full-blown and integrated capacity building plan, its training processes and
procedures ended up to be largely school-based and, in effect, quite flexible.5
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management culture are just as significant,
particularly in finance management.
Both Project BEAM and TEEP have ended but
their positive outcomes contributed to the
incorporation of SBM into DepEd’s BESRA and
its critical role as its linchpin. Nevertheless,
the scaling up of SBM to other divisions has
not moved fast enough. An examination of
some of the constraints to widespread
implementation provides a glimpse into some
of the factors that have prevented education
reforms in the past from truly transforming
education on the ground.
Constraints to education reform
A number of factors have stood in the way of
enhancing DepEd’s capacity to shift
paradigms, and transform and scale up
successful reform initiatives like the SBM.
Many of these are institutional in nature. A
major factor singled out in the education
chapter of the PHDR is DepEd’s almost entire
dependence on foreign-assisted projects that
have reform activities built into pilot project
components.
The last 20 years have witnessed, for example,
the syndrome of “projectization.” DepEd
seemed to have moved from one foreign-
assisted program to another, with donor
agencies taking the lead in initiating,
nurturing, monitoring, and seeing the reform-
oriented projects through to their completion.
Furthermore, since reform initiatives were
mostly undertaken on a pilot project basis,
moving from one externally funded project to
another has reduced the institution’s energy
to move a notch higher, to scaling up the
implementation of the reform.
This situation is compounded by the fact that
most of the donor-initiated reform projects,
while administered within DepEd itself, lie
outside the main line of operations of the
education bureaucracy. As a consequence, the
reform projects remain peripheral to the
operation of DepEd throughout their
implementation. This has thus prevented the
Department from orchestrating, directing, and
worse, owning the reform process. It has also
kept DepEd from developing an
institutionalized system of processing and
reviewing the project outcomes and their
implications for reform throughout the public
school system.
There is nothing wrong with treating reform
interventions as projects within DepEd, with
the Department leaders setting clear targets
for the completion of different components of
the process and the organic staff seconded to
ensure that the reform-oriented goals are
achieved. “Projectization” becomes
problematic—and this is what the chapter on
education in the PHDR criticizes—when
scaling up or sustaining reforms is not done
without external prodding or when the actors
involved in the project no longer sustain the
implementation of the reforms after the
project ends.
It is important to note, however, that not all
the factors constraining education reform are6
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within DepEd’s control. For one, there are
procedural mismatches in the national budget
cycle which stymie the release of funds in
critical stages of project implementation. The
political meddling of national and local
officials also affects the course of reform
implementation.
But perhaps one of the major factors that
hinder education reform has been the
constant change in the leadership of DepEd.
In eight years since 2000, there has been a
succession of six secretaries of education. The
critical role of the education secretary cannot
be overemphasized. After all, the secretary
possesses the power to push the bureaucracy
to prioritize the implementation of a reform
agenda. He/she can also break the impasse
either in policy revision or in the
implementation of existing policy. The rapid
turnover of the education leadership in
previous years has thus resulted in breaks in
the momentum of decentralization as
embodied in the SBM reform.
A strong leadership alone, however, is not
sufficient. It must also be accompanied by a
strong second layer of career executives who
will be able to sustain the reform agenda
when the people at the helm changes with
each new administration. Likewise, a second
layer of career executives will not be able to
hasten the pace of reform without good
leaders at the regional, division, and school
levels. One of the key lessons from Project
BEAM and TEEP is that leadership at all levels
matter, but mostly at the levels closest to the
ground.
Apart from these institutional factors, there
are also other constraints such as the
traditional norms that guide everyday life in
the bureaucracy. These include prevailing
behaviors, practices, and mindsets. As in
other government agencies, resistance to
institutional change seems to outbalance the
push for reform within the DepEd bureaucracy.
This is unfortunate since both Project BEAM
and TEEP have shown that bureaucratic
cultures can change without a change of
actors.
Hope for the future: the Basic
Education Sector Reform Agenda
(BESRA)
Given the above discussion, is there hope for
the transformation of the Philippines’ basic
education system?
The task may be gargantuan but the prospects
are bright. Building on the gains of previous
projects like BEAM and TEEP, the BESRA that
DepEd launched in 2006 holds much promise
for the future of Filipino children. It is a
comprehensive and sector-wide reform
...One of the major factors that hinder education reform
has been the constant change in the leadership of
DepEd. In eight years since 2000, there has been a
succession of six secretaries of education...The rapid
turnover of the education leadership in previous years
has thus resulted in breaks in the momentum of
decentralization as embodied in the SBM reform.7
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package that aims to change the entire sector
and not just target sites for pilot
implementation. Its general objectives are
anchored on the targets of the EFA global
program for universal access and success of
children in basic education schooling. A major
premise of BESRA is the importance of school-
based management for attaining the targets
for the entire sector.
Because it approaches reform from a broad
and multicomponent perspective, BESRA
provides a significant deviation from the
previous pilot project approach. It also differs
from previous practice in that it hopes to
involve various sectors at different levels of
the education bureaucracy not only in the
implementation stage but also and more
importantly in the key planning aspects of
the reform activity. This hopes to ensure that
BESRA will not be a project run independently
of the mainstream DepEd offices.
Another important development is the extent
to which DepEd has engaged the larger
public, apart from the various sectors within
the education bureaucracy, in its advocacy of
the BESRA. This advocacy now includes the
donor community which seems to have forged
a tacit agreement to fund programs within the
BESRA framework. Interestingly, the local and
national stakeholders in education seem to
have also bought into the BESRA framework.
In summary, the more extensive involvement
of the DepEd bureaucracy, the wide consensus
building, and the increased levels of
accountability being exacted from DepEd are
features of the BESRA that, hopefully, would
give it the needed impetus to transform the
education on the ground.
Making BESRA move forward:
recommendations
Despite the positive features of BESRA,
however, there remain a good number of
skeptics, both within and outside DepEd, who
believe that the institution does not have the
means to carry out reforms other than
through disjointed externally initiated
projects. Moreover, these cynics and skeptics
feel that the positive developments
associated with BESRA remain tenuous
because efforts could easily revert to the old
practices when the implementation becomes
difficult and/or when the highest levels of
leadership do not push for these changes in
practice. Indeed, the challenge for DepEd is
how to revise and strengthen its various
institutional processes to enable it to carry
out its own reform agenda. The much-needed
tasks are many, among which are the
following:
Assess and manage risks. DepEd should take
more deliberate steps toward assessing and
DepEd should take more deliberate steps toward
assessing and anticipating the risks at the different
levels of DepEd’s operations. These include risks at the
community and school levels, keeping in mind the wide
diversity in the economic and socio-political conditions
surrounding the over 50,000 schools in the country.8
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anticipating the risks at the different levels of
DepEd’s operations. These include risks at the
community and school levels, keeping in mind
the wide diversity in the economic and socio-
political conditions surrounding the over
50,000 schools in the country. There are also
important risks related to the middle and
higher levels of the DepEd bureaucracy.
Decentralization, by definition, will mean
shifting resources and decisionmaking closer
to the ground, which would have implications
for the functions of the DepEd’s central
bureaus, regional offices, and division offices.
Anticipating these risks and learning from the
experiences of TEEP and Project BEAM should
contribute toward fine-tuning the
implementation aspects of  BESRA.
Strengthen TWGs and multisectoral decisions.
The creation of technical working groups
(TWGs) which are responsible for the
attainment of BESRA’s key reform thrusts
(KRTs) is a positive step toward gaining
more widespread ownership of the
outcomes of the reforms as it involves a
process of representation and consensus
building. The effectiveness of the TWGs,
however, is highly dependent on
whether their composition remains truly
representative, and on the extent to
which the representations truly strive to
forge consensus within their respective
constituencies.
Expand advocacy and social marketing of
BESRA. Getting the entire DepEd
bureaucracy to become more aware of
BESRA and commit to it in the shortest
possible time is urgent. Beyond DepEd, the
commitment of more sectors to BESRA would
not only provide DepEd with a stronger
network of support but also create a larger
community that can demand accountabilities
from DepEd. Thus, in the shorter term,
advocacy and social marketing will provide
DepEd with the resources to augment its
limited coffers. In the longer term, this wide
social network will be DepEd’s watchdog that
will keep it on its toes, so to speak.
Prioritize capacity building. The key features of
reform directed at decentralization involve
empowering and capacitating sectors of the
DepEd bureaucracy who have traditionally
been left to fend for themselves and make do
with what little they have. For
decentralization to work, DepEd needs
personnel, especially teachers, who can be
For decentralization to work, DepEd needs personnel, especially teachers, who
can be effective despite the limited resources at their command.9
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effective despite the limited resources at
their command. Thus, DepEd ought to
prioritize efforts to build capacities among its
staff, and focus on capacity building that is
self-sustaining in the long term.
Continue  developing efficient systems of
procurement, financial management, human
resources, and formula-based allocation of
MOOE. The 28 April 2008 joint World Bank and
AusAid Report on the implementation of
BESRA noted improvements in the system of
procurement of goods. It cited, for instance,
that DepEd’s decision to unbundle
procurement of manuscripts from printing
contributed to a lower price of textbooks.
Efforts to further push for this kind of
improvements must therefore continue. So
should improvements in the areas of, among
others, financial management, human
resource information system, and
management information system.
Prioritize efficient and cost-effective
interventions. Given the volatility of the fiscal
situation that surrounds DepEd’s operations,
it is not likely that the material resources
available will improve dramatically in the
future. DepEd’s dependency on donor
organizations is understandable as it pushes
for major reforms, but there are long-term
consequences to such dependence. Thus,
DepEd should push for reform activities that
do not require additional infusion of external
funds, or that involve more cost-effective use
of existing funds at all levels of the
bureaucracy.
Redefine the role of DepEd central offices. In
line with the preceding suggestions, there is a
need to redefine the role of the DepEd Central
Office, including its various bureaus. The
present institutional culture of DepEd is such
that no one down the line moves unless there
is an explicit instruction or memo from the
higher offices. This top-down management
process is antithetical to the core values of
decentralization in BESRA, and will need to
be reconfigured. For the schools to be truly
empowered, the central office needs to take
on different functions other than prescribing
practices. It should thus take on roles that
are more similar to orchestrating different
units and ensuring that they move toward the
same goal, even as they may move through
various routes.
Define new metrics of success. At some point,
when the consequences of BESRA become
more concrete, DepEd will need to develop
more appropriate metrics for assessing its
progress. Clearly, some of the standard metrics
such as participation rate, cohort survival
rate, and drop out rate, and all those defined
in the EFA 2015 need to be preserved. In
...Some of the standard metrics such as participation
rate, cohort survival rate, and drop out rate, and all
those defined in the EFA 2015 need to be preserved. In
some of the more important goals of BESRA, however,
particularly goals related to school-based management,
teacher quality, and the attainment of curriculum
standards, DepEd will need to develop better
assessment tools and systems.10
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some of the more important goals of BESRA,
however, particularly goals related to school-
based management, teacher quality, and the
attainment of curriculum standards, DepEd
will need to develop better assessment tools
and systems. Some metrics will also need to
be reconsidered. For example, if some schools
successfully develop learning modules that
involve indigenous learning resources,
textbooks may then become unnecessary.
Thus, the metric of one textbook per student
may no longer be appropriate and the most
important metric would be one that relates to
student learning.
Concluding remarks
Since the 1920s, various reformist
interventions that have sought to change the
face of the country’s education seem to have
failed. The tireless repetition of issues in
most analyses of Philippine education
problems and the seeming inability of the
education bureaucracy to implement well-
articulated, discursive, and comprehensive
reform frameworks have made skeptics out of
many educators, educationists, and the public
at large.
Indeed, the challenges have been daunting
for reformists who have aimed to change
either institutional structures and processes
or classroom and out-of-classroom learning.
But there could be certain interventions that
are built on previous recommendations for
institutional reforms in DepEd which have not
only improved student achievement
remarkably, but have also begun to change
the institutional culture in pockets of the
DepEd bureaucracy without changing its
staffing. The formulation of BESRA’s
components is one that is built on such
interventions.
In BESRA therefore lies the hope of
widespread institutional reform that would
finally lead to changes in the Philippines’
education landscape. Hence, it is important
that BESRA’s multicomponent, multilevel, and
multidisciplinary agenda gets the necessary
focused and sustained implementation across
political administrations. 
In BESRA lies the hope of widespread institutional
reform that would finally lead to changes in the
Philippines’ education landscape. Hence, it is
important that BESRA’s multicomponent, multilevel,
and multidisciplinary agenda gets the necessary
focused and sustained implementation across political
administrations.